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Transitions, Transformations and the Role of Elites 
Heinrich Best ∗ 
Abstract: »Transitionen, Transformationen und die Rolle der Eliten«. The vast 
majority of social scientists have failed to predict the breakdown of European 
communism in 1989 and the same mischief occurred to most of the economists 
with regard to the international crisis of capitalism in 2009. My contribution 
argues that this failure was due to “linear thinking” of the observers involved 
and not to an inherent unpredictability of the phenomena in question. It is fur-
ther suggested that we see here a fallacy of path-theory which ignores system-
atically the possibility of a trade-off between decreasing transaction costs of an 
established path and increasing opportunity costs of following the same path. 
Elites are the demiurgs of change if the existing order threatens their status and 
they are the promoters of stability if a new order which is in their interest has 
been established. 
Keywords: transition, transformation, democracy, market-economy, commu-
nism, elites, path-dependency, challenge-response-model. 
 
It was an intellectually stimulating accident of history that the 20th anniversary 
of the annus mirabilis of 1989, which ushered in the triumph of democracy and 
market economy, coincided with the annus horribilis of 2009 when we saw the 
worst crisis of western capitalism since the 1930s. Both upheavals share, as 
much as they differ in other respects, one peculiarity: they were both unpre-
dicted and they raised serious questions about the theoretical and epistemologi-
cal bases of the social sciences. After 1989 sociology and – to a somewhat 
lesser degree – political science was in the focus of criticism for not having 
diagnosed properly the inherent instability of the social and political order of 
communist societies and polities of the soviet model. Economics profited in 
this period from being the master interpreter of the principles of market econ-
omy. In 2009 it is predominantly economics which was hit by an economic 
crisis which started with a sudden and fatal dysfunction of the international 
financial markets.  
Both cases – the breakdown of communism in 1989 and the crash of 2009 – 
entailed a failure to predict these crises. The disciplines involved had one ap-
parently good reason for their failure: that the crises they failed to predict were 
historical singularities, i.e. that they belong to a type of events which are by 
their very nature unpredictable. The idea is here that these events are produced 
by conjunctures or “intercurrences”, i.e. by the specific timing of otherwise 
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completely unconnected streams of activity. The classical example is provided 
by Raymond Aron in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History and quoted 
in Paul Pierson’s seminal ‘Politics in Time’ (2004): A man takes the same walk 
every day. On one occasion a heavy tile becomes dislodged from a building 
along his route. Depending upon the particular timing of these two streams of 
activity (strolling man, falling tile), the observed outcome will be radically 
different. If the two streams of activity produce a “conjuncture” the result is 
calamitous. 
So, was the communist world or the world of financial markets hit by the 
proverbial falling tile? Do we observe here a Cournot-effect which requires an 
external intervention and the intersection of two otherwise unconnected causal 
chains at a specific point in time? I think we do not. Neither the communist 
system nor the financial markets were brought down by some externally in-
flicted disaster. Their crises emerged within these systems. They were self-
inflicted and results of accumulative degenerative processes which finally led 
to their demise. These outcomes were predictable and indeed predicted by a 
few observers. If they were not predicted by the vast majority of observers this 
was basically due to a misperception of reality and not by some inherent un-
predictability of the same reality. I think that we, and this “we” includes aca-
demics, are inclined to linear thinking, to a world-view which assumes as a 
natural given that what has been will be in the future as well, only better or 
more so. This concept underlies the idea of never-ending progress and has been 
theoretically canonized in modernization theories (Boudon 1994). 
A formal basis for this kind of thinking has been developed with the notion 
of path-dependency, which is founded in the idea of positive feedback and 
increasing returns (Arthur 1988). In these concepts the established path enjoys 
an increasing premium against alternatives. The basic model underlying path-
dependency is the Polya-urn process which links current probabilities to the 
outcomes of preceding (partly random) sequences. This process leads to an 
increasing attractiveness of any established path (Pierson and Scocpol 2002).  
Path theory became a path of increasing epistemological attractiveness it-
self. In many respects it took the position functionalism had occupied thirty 
years ago. The problem is that path theory like functionalism is not very good 
in modeling and forecasting crises and crashes. It ignores systematically the 
possibility of a trade-off between decreasing transaction costs of an established 
path and increasing opportunity costs of following the same path, which may 
consequently become increasingly inefficient compared to other paths. Increas-
ing path inefficiency may lead to a deep crises and even collapse of a given 
institutional setting (Best 2007). 
An approach which ignores or fails to consider systematically this type of 
outcomes and the inherent non-linearity of historical developments is incom-
plete and fundamentally flawed. The Collaborative Research Centre “Social 
Development After Structural Change. Discontinuity, Tradition, structure 
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Building” has therefore followed a different path of theoretical thinking. We 
adopted the challenge-response-model which was originally introduced by the 
British historical philosopher Arnold Toynbee (1961) and matched it with 
recent theoretical concepts like Claudio Cioffi-Revilla’s Canonial Theory of 
Origins and Developments of Social Complexity (2005). It assumes an inherent 
nonlinearity of all developmental processes (Best 2007; 2004). 
At this point elites and their decision-making come into play: Strategically 
positioned groups of actors in institutional and social settings respond to chal-
lenges which threaten the stability and security of the same settings. With their 
responses actors try to reduce insecurity and to stabilize or reestablish the so-
cial setting. From a successful response emerges an adapted setting which turns 
into a slower process of “probabilistic” transformation. In this process dysfunc-
tions within the setting are likely to emerge which may develop into a new 
challenging threat to the reproduction and existence of the social setting i. e. 
into secondary challenges (Best and Becker 1997; Best 2007a). 
In periods of transition, when established contexts of action become weak-
ened or obsolete, elites are confronted with a double challenge: On the one 
hand the range of options they have to shape their polities and societies in-
creases dramatically. For a historical moment everything seems possible except 
perhaps the continuation of the status quo. On the other hand, they loose in 
potency and efficacy because the institutions for the exercise and retention of 
power are gravely weakened or even disappear (Best 2007b). In this situation 
new contenders, counter elites and secondary elites appear on the scene and 
compete for strategic power positions. Elite-circulation – normally an incre-
mental and controlled process – takes place erratically and chaotically. In these 
moments the fate of societies and polities depends on the willingness and abil-
ity to bring about comprehensive elite settlements which avoid the use of vio-
lence and the outbreak of outright civil war and which forge an agreement on 
the basic design of a new institutional order for the power system of a given 
society and polity (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley and Burton 2006). The 
agreements made in these circumstances have a chance to lay ground for a new 
institutional order and a stable elite setting if they create a win-win situation for 
all relevant elite-groups involved in the agreement and open up a wide time-
horizon for their restrained competition as “associated rivals” (Best 2010). The 
new institutional order and the elite-settings which are established and formed 
at these critical junctures of history lay out a new institutional basis for social 
economic and political development. The future development evolves at a 
lower speed and in more settled institutional forms. 
The title of this special issue: “Transitions – Transformations. Trajectories 
of Social, Economic and Political Change after Communism” embraces the full 
canonical sequence of challenges and responses, short term-transitions and long 
term transformations which bring about second-order challenges which in turn 
require new responses. We have deliberately refrained from imposing the chal-
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lenge-response model on the contributions to this issue, but we are of course 
curious in which ways and to what extent this model may serve as a theoretical 
and heuristical tool for analyzing the great transformation after communism. If 
this tool and a look backwards covering the past 20 years to the beginning in 
1989 help understanding our present crisis, we would be even happier. We 
believe that the period of post-communist transformation is over. We are not 
implying that post-communist societies and polities have successfully caught 
up to their western models. We rather suggest that the challenges they are con-
fronting today result no more from their transition from communism to democ-
racy and market economy, but from the dysfunctions of the democracy and 
market economy they have adopted in the 1990s. 
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